If-Thenism—A Nominalistic Account of Talk About Abstracta?

Australasian Philosophical Review 1 (2):179-183 (2017)


ABSTRACTAccording to Yablo, in uttering sentences that imply the existence of abstract objects, we do not assert their literal content. Instead, we only make a weaker conditional claim that does not have the controversial implication. In this commentary I argue that the conditional claims Yablo suggests we are making are true only if abstract objects exist and, thus, also carry the controversial implication.

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Katharina Felka
Uppsala University

References found in this work

Aboutness.Stephen Yablo - 2014 - Princeton University Press.
Index.Stephen Yablo - 2014 - In Aboutness. Princeton University Press. pp. 219-222.
Nominalism and the Contingency of Abstract Objects.Crispin Wright & Bob Hale - 1992 - Journal of Philosophy 89 (3):111-135.
What Can We Take Away From Easy Arguments?Amie L. Thomasson - 2017 - Australasian Philosophical Review 1 (2):153-162.

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