In Uskali Mäki, Ioannis Votsis, Stephanie Ruphy & Gerhard Schurz (eds.), Recent Developments in the Philosophy of Science: EPSA13 Helsinki. Heidelberg: Springer. pp. 87-98 (2015)

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Abstract
In the debate of epistemic peer disagreement the equal-weight view suggests to split the difference between one's own and one's peer's opinions. An argument in favour of this view---which is prominently held by Adam Elga---is that by such a difference-splitting one may make some use of a so-called wise-crowd effect. In this paper it is argued that such a view faces two main problems: First, the problem that the standards for making use of a wise-crowd effect are quite low. And second, the problem that following the equal-weight view decreases such effects and by this the argument's own basis is defeated. We therefore come to the conclusion that an argument for the equal-weight view with the help of wise-crowd effects as provided more or less explicitly by Elga does not succeed.
Keywords epistemic peer disagreement  equal-weight view  wisdom of the crowd  Condorcet Jury Theorem
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