Synthese 161 (3):339 - 355 (2008)

Authors
Richard Feldman
University of Rochester
Abstract
Deontologism in epistemology holds that epistemic justification may be understood in terms of “deontological” sentences about what one ought to believe or is permitted to believe, or what one deserves praise for believing, or in some similar way. If deonotologism is true, and people have justified beliefs, then the deontological sentences can be true. However, some say, these deontological sentences can be true only if people have a kind of freedom or control over their beliefs that they do not in fact have. Thus, deontologism in epistemology, combined with anti-skepticism, has implausible implications. I first describe one sort of control that people typically have over ordinary actions but do not have over typical beliefs. I then argue that there is a paradigmatic type of epistemic evaluation that does properly apply to beliefs even though we lack this sort of control over them. Finally, I argue that these paradigmatic epistemic evaluations are sufficient to make true some of the deontological sentences.
Keywords Epistemic deontologism  Justification  Belief control  Epistemic evaluation
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11229-006-9088-y
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 68,975
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Warrant and Proper Function.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - Oxford University Press.
Evidentialism.Richard Feldman & Earl Conee - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 48 (1):15 - 34.
The Ethics of Belief.Richard Feldman - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):667-695.
Doxastic Compatibilism and the Ethics of Belief.Sharon Ryan - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 114 (1-2):47-79.
The Ethics of Belief.Richard Feldman - 2000 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):667-695.

View all 10 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions.Selim Berker - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (3):337-393.
Dilemmic Epistemology.Nick Hughes - 2019 - Synthese 196 (10):4059-4090.
Against Doxastic Compatibilism.Rik Peels - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):679-702.

View all 29 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
224 ( #49,404 of 2,498,264 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #212,099 of 2,498,264 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes