Natural compatibilism versus natural incompatibilism: Back to the drawing board

Mind and Language 24 (1):1-23 (2009)
Authors
Thomas Nadelhoffer
College of Charleston
Abstract
In the free will literature, some compatibilists and some incompatibilists claim that their views best capture ordinary intuitions concerning free will and moral responsibility. One goal of researchers working in the field of experimental philosophy has been to probe ordinary intuitions in a controlled and systematic way to help resolve these kinds of intuitional stalemates. We contribute to this debate by presenting new data about folk intuitions concerning freedom and responsibility that correct for some of the shortcomings of previous studies. These studies also illustrate some problems that pertain to all of the studies that have been run thus far.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2008.01351.x
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References found in this work BETA

The Significance of Free Will.Robert Kane - 1996 - Oxford University Press USA.
Free Will and Luck.Alfred R. Mele - 2006 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Experimental Philosophy and Free Will.Tamler Sommers - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (2):199-212.
On the Very Concept of Free Will.Joshua May - 2014 - Synthese 191 (12):2849-2866.

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