Reasons explanations and pure agency

Philosophical Studies 112 (2):135-145 (2003)
Abstract
We focus on the recent non-causal theory of reasons explanationsof free action proffered by a proponent of the agency theory, Timothy O'Connor. We argue that the conditions O'Connor offersare neither necessary nor sufficient for a person to act for a reason. Finally, we note that the role O'Connor assigns toreasons in the etiology of actions results in further conceptual difficulties for agent-causalism.
Keywords Agency  Explanation  Free Will  Metaphysics  Reasons  O'connor, T
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DOI 10.1023/A:1022542004219
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Freedom With a Human Face.Timothy O'Connor - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):207-227.
Causalisms Reconsidered.Andrei A. Buckareff & Jing Zhu - 2004 - Dialogue 43 (01):147-.

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