Rationality, reliability, and natural selection

Philosophy of Science 55 (June):218-27 (1988)
Abstract
A tempting argument for human rationality goes like this: it is more conducive to survival to have true beliefs than false beliefs, so it is more conducive to survival to use reliable belief-forming strategies than unreliable ones. But reliable strategies are rational strategies, so there is a selective advantage to using rational strategies. Since we have evolved, we must use rational strategies. In this paper I argue that some criticisms of this argument offered by Stephen Stich fail because they rely on unsubstantiated interpretations of some results from experimental psychology. I raise two objections to the argument: (i) even if it is advantageous to use rational strategies, it does not follow that we actually use them; and (ii) natural selection need not favor only or even primarily reliable belief-forming strategies
Keywords Belief  Epistemology  Natural Selection  Rationality  Reliability  Stich, S
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DOI 10.1086/289428
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Rationality Disputes – Psychology and Epistemology.Patrick Rysiew - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (6):1153-1176.
Evolution, Altruism, and the Prisoner's Dilemma.Ishtiyaque Haji - 1992 - Biology and Philosophy 7 (2):161-175.

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