Reply to Elinor Mason and Alastair Norcross

Utilitas 19 (3):398-406 (2007)
Abstract
In comments originally presented at the ISUS conference at Dartmouth College in 2005, Elinor Mason and Alastair Norcross raised a number of objections to various things I said in Pleasure and the Good Life. One especially interesting objection concerns one of my central claims about the nature of pleasure. I distinguished between sensory pleasure and attitudinal pleasure. I said that a feeling counts as a sensory pleasure if the one who feels it takes intrinsic attitudinal pleasure in the fact that he is then feeling it. I also said that attitudinal pleasure is a propositional attitude that does not intrinsically involve any particular 'feelings'. On my view, a person can take attitudinal pleasure in things at a time even though he does not feel any pleasurable feelings at that time. In their comments, Mason and Norcross expressed doubts about my account of attitudinal pleasure. In my reply, I try to answer those doubts.
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DOI 10.1017/S095382080700266X
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