The Face‐Value Theory, Know‐that, Know‐wh and Know‐how

Abstract

For sentences such as (1), "Columbus knows that the sea is unpredictable", there is a face-value theory, according to which ‘that’-clauses are singular terms denoting propositions. Famously, Prior raised an objection to the theory, but defenders of the face-value theory such as Forbes, King, Künne, Pietroski and Stanley urged that the objection could be met by maintaining that in (1) ‘to know’ designates a complex relation along the lines of being in a state of knowledge having as content. Is the theory safe, then? The aim of this paper is to show that a new problem for the theory arises if we consider attributions of skills, knacks, propensities and abilities.

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Author's Profile

Giulia Felappi
University of Southampton

References found in this work

The Nature and Structure of Content.Jeffrey C. King - 2007 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.
Conceptions of Truth.Wolfgang Künne - 2003 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Objects of Thought.Arthur Norman Prior - 1971 - Oxford, England: Clarendon Press.

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