Philosophical Studies 161 (2):227-246 (2012)
Perhaps personality traits substantially influence one’s philosophically relevant intuitions. This suggestion is not only possible, it is consistent with a growing body of empirical research: Personality traits have been shown to be systematically related to diverse intuitions concerning some fundamental philosophical debates. We argue that this fact, in conjunction with the plausible principle that almost all adequate philosophical views should take into account all available and relevant evidence, calls into question some prominent approaches to traditional philosophical projects. To this end, we present the Philosophical Personality Argument (PPA). We explain how it supports the growing body of evidence challenging some of the uses of intuitions in philosophy, and we defend it from some criticisms of empirically based worries about intuitions in philosophy. We conclude that the current evidence indicates that the PPA is sound, and thus many traditional philosophical projects that use intuitions must become substantially more empirically oriented.
|Keywords||Experimental philosophy Intuitions Personality Philosophical method Psychology|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis.Frank Jackson - 1998 - Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Persistent Bias in Expert Judgments About Free Will and Moral Responsibility: A Test of the Expertise Defense.E. Schultz, E. T. Cokely & A. Feltz - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1722-1731.
Pereboom and Premises: Asking the Right Questions in the Experimental Philosophy of Free Will.Adam Feltz - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (1):53-63.
An Error Theory for Compatibilist Intuitions.Adam Feltz & Melissa Millan - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (4):529-555.
Intuitive Expertise and Intuitions About Knowledge.Joachim Horvath & Alex Wiegmann - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2701-2726.
Moral Character: An Empirical Theory. [REVIEW]Adam Feltz - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (7):1079-1082.
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