The Philosophical Personality Argument

Philosophical Studies 161 (2):227-246 (2012)
Abstract
Perhaps personality traits substantially influence one’s philosophically relevant intuitions. This suggestion is not only possible, it is consistent with a growing body of empirical research: Personality traits have been shown to be systematically related to diverse intuitions concerning some fundamental philosophical debates. We argue that this fact, in conjunction with the plausible principle that almost all adequate philosophical views should take into account all available and relevant evidence, calls into question some prominent approaches to traditional philosophical projects. To this end, we present the Philosophical Personality Argument (PPA). We explain how it supports the growing body of evidence challenging some of the uses of intuitions in philosophy, and we defend it from some criticisms of empirically based worries about intuitions in philosophy. We conclude that the current evidence indicates that the PPA is sound, and thus many traditional philosophical projects that use intuitions must become substantially more empirically oriented.
Keywords Experimental philosophy  Intuitions  Personality  Philosophical method  Psychology
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9731-4
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,122
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
The Emotional Construction of Morals.Jesse J. Prinz - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1955 - Harvard University Press.

View all 62 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Intuitive Expertise and Intuitions About Knowledge.Joachim Horvath & Alex Wiegmann - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2701-2726.
An Error Theory for Compatibilist Intuitions.Adam Feltz & Melissa Millan - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (4):529-555.
Moral Character: An Empirical Theory. [REVIEW]Adam Feltz - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (7):1079-1082.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
The Virtues of Ignorance.Adam Feltz & Edward T. Cokely - 2012 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (3):335-350.
A Defense of Intuitions.S. Matthew Liao - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 140 (2):247 - 262.
Can Modal Intuitions Be Evidence for Essentialist Claims?Janet Levin - 2007 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 50 (3):253 – 269.
Problems with the Appeal to Intuition in Epistemology.Adam Feltz - 2008 - Philosophical Explorations 11 (2):131 – 141.
Sidgwick's Philosophical Intuitions.Anthony Skelton - 2008 - Etica and Politica / Ethics & Politics 10 (2):185-209.
Intuitions Are Inclinations to Believe.Joshua Earlenbaugh & Bernard Molyneux - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (1):89 - 109.
Some Hope for Intuitions: A Reply to Weinberg.Thomas Grundmann - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (4):481-509.
Added to PP index
2011-04-26

Total downloads
104 ( #49,785 of 2,191,731 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #144,668 of 2,191,731 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature