Indispensability argument and anti-realism in philosophy of mathematics

Frontiers of Philosophy in China 2 (4):614-628 (2007)

Authors
Yu Feng
University of Copenhagen
Abstract This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)
Keywords nominalism   realism   Quine   anti-realism   philosophy of mathematics   indispensability argument
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References found in this work BETA

Naturalism in Mathematics.Penelope Maddy - 1997 - Oxford University Press.
Mathematical Truth.Paul Benacerraf - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (19):661-679.
Science Without Numbers.Michael D. Resnik - 1983 - Noûs 17 (3):514-519.
A Subject with No Object.Zoltan Gendler Szabo, John P. Burgess & Gideon Rosen - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (1):106.

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Indispensability Argument and Anti-Realism in Philosophy of Mathematics.Feng Ye - 2007 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 2 (4):614-628.
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Indispensability Without Platonism.Anne Newstead & James Franklin - 2012 - In Alexander Bird, Brian Ellis & Howard Sankey (eds.), Properties, Powers, and Structures: Issues in the Metaphysics of Realism. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 81-97.
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