Journal of Speculative Philosophy 27 (4):365-387 (2013)

Among the traditional issues in philosophy that are directly affected by Michael Polanyi's revolutionary epistemology and its related ontology are nominalism and the question of universals. Polanyi's treatment of these matters is particularly fruitful, for it not only clarifies his conceptions of "tacit knowing" and "indwelling" but also illuminates his understanding of truth and reality and introduces us to his views on induction. Such inquiry will also demonstrate a deep affinity between Polanyi's position and that of Charles Sanders Peirce, while at the same time illustrating how Polanyi joins a number of late nineteenth- and early to mid-twentieth-century philosophers in aiming to resolve central problems of ..
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DOI 10.5325/jspecphil.27.4.0365
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