Marco Fenici
Università degli Studi di Firenze
Recent studies demonstrated that 15-month-olds selectively respond to others’ beliefs. According to an epistemic mentalist interpretation, this attests that 15-month-olds possess a rudimentary capacity to attribute beliefs. Weaker interpretations suggest instead that infants are only sensitive to others’ beliefs because they can detect their proximal correlates. These two opposed interpretations often appeal to principled objections. In contrast, I argue that the dispute can be brought back to its empirical basis if we clearly explain what it means having ‘tacit’ or ‘implicit’ knowledge of a theory. I introduce a definition of tacit knowledge based on the notion of structural similarity, and I discuss some crucial experiments that may be conducted to assess the validity of the epistemic mentalist interpretation.
Keywords false belief test  folk psychology  mind reading  social cognition  social understanding  theory of mind
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2012, 2013
DOI 10.13128/annali_dip_filos-13567
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 70,265
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Aspects of the Theory of Syntax.Noam Chomsky - 1965 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.
The Origin of Concepts.Susan Carey - 2009 - Oxford University Press.

View all 48 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

What Does the False Belief Test Test?Marco Fenici - 2011 - Phenomenology and Mind 1:197-207.
Embodied Social Cognition and Embedded Theory of Mind.Marco Fenici - 2012 - Biolinguistics 6 (3--47):276--307.
Folk Psychology as a Theory.Ian Martin Ravenscroft - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Folk Psychology as Narrative Practice.Daniel D. Hutto - 2009 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (6-8):6 - 8.


Added to PP index

Total views
15 ( #698,074 of 2,507,714 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
5 ( #139,870 of 2,507,714 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes