Axiological and practical reason in Husserl

Veritas: Revista de Filosofía y Teología 27 (27):77-95 (2012)
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Abstract

El artículo pretende ofrecer algunas claves interpretativas de la Axiología y Práctica materiales de Husserl. El estudio de la primera parte se centra en la cuestión de la verdad y el cumplimiento de los actos no objetivantes. La segunda parte analiza los sentidos que en Husserl tiene la noción práctica de fin y pone en conexión la verdad práctica con el imperativo categórico en su versión husserliana de actuar según el mejor saber y la mejor conciencia, aplicado tanto a las acciones particulares como a la voluntad común de perfeccionamiento que las preside. Se termina con unas conclusiones valorativas. The aim of this article is to offer some interpretative keys of Husserl´s material Axiology and Practice. The study of the former focuses on the fulfilment and truth in not objectivant acts. The latter analyzes the meanings that the notion of end acquires in Husserl and connects the practical truth with the categorial imperative in its Husserlian version, that says "act according to the best knowing and the best conscience", applied to both particular actions and the common will of perfecting that presides over them. The article ends with valuation

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