Noûs 43 (4):700 - 741 (2009)
Authors |
|
Abstract |
In this paper, I will discuss the various ways in which intentions can be said to be conditional, with particular attention to the internal conditions on the intentions’ content. I will first consider what it takes to carry out a conditional intention. I will then discuss how the distinctive norms of intention apply to conditional intentions and whether conditional intentions are a weaker sort of commitments than the unconditional ones. This discussion will lead to the idea of what I call the ‘deep structure’ of intentions. Roughly, this is the idea that the conditional nature of our intentions is only partially made explicit in the expressions we use to communicate our intentions and in the explicit form of our thinking about and reasoning with them. Most conditions that qualify our intentions are part of a deep functional structure that can be evinced by observing the actual psychological functioning of intentions and by considering the rational requirements that they engage. I will argue that the deep structure of intentions is characteristically conditional. Genuinely unconditional intentions are only limiting instances of conditional intentions and their contribution to agency can only be understood in light of this fact. I will conclude by showing that the characteristic conditional structure of intentions is intimately related to distinctive features of human agency, especially to its unity over time
|
Keywords | Conditional Intention Conditional Intention |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
DOI | 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2009.00725.x |
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity.Christine M. Korsgaard - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
View all 48 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
Intending is Believing: A Defense of Strong Cognitivism.Berislav Marušić & John Schwenkler - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (3):309-340.
The Myth of Practical Consistency.Niko Kolodny - 2008 - European Journal of Philosophy 16 (3):366-402.
Imperative Inference and Practical Rationality.Daniel W. Harris - 2021 - Philosophical Studies (4):1065-1090.
Can I Only Intend My Own Actions?Luca Ferrero - 2013 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Action and Responsibility. Oxford University Press. pp. (1) 70-94.
View all 23 citations / Add more citations
Similar books and articles
Proximal Intentions, Intention-Reports, and Vetoing.Alfred Mele - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (1):1 – 14.
Conditional Intentions, Intentional Action and Aristotelian Practical Syllogisms.Hector-Neri Castañeda - 1982 - Erkenntnis 18 (2):239 - 260.
Conditionals, Comparative Probability, and Triviality: The Conditional of Conditional Probability Cannot Be Represented in the Object Language.Charles G. Morgan - 1999 - Topoi 18 (2):97-116.
Intentions, Goals, and the Archaeological Record.Rex Welshon - 2002 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (3):425-426.
We-Intentions, Free-Riding, and Being in Reserve.Raimo Tuomela & Kaarlo Miller - 1992 - Erkenntnis 36 (1):25 - 52.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2009-09-18
Total views
435 ( #22,042 of 2,504,607 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
25 ( #36,090 of 2,504,607 )
2009-09-18
Total views
435 ( #22,042 of 2,504,607 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
25 ( #36,090 of 2,504,607 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads