Abstract

Kierkegaard is usually read as a defender of some kind of relativism due to his frequent statements on subjectivity. Nevertheless, if we go deeper into his works, it is possible to see that his position is much more puzzling. In fact, if it is true that the concept of subjectivity plays a central role in his thought, it is also true that the Danish philosopher does not endorse a relativistic view on knowledge, but he argues for a realistic understanding of the nature of certain kinds of thoughts. Accordingly, what emerges from the necessary relation between existence and thought is philosophically more sophisticated than the view we could call the ‘standard reading’ of Kierkegaard’s epistemological positions. In this paper, I aim to show that Kierkegaard’s reflections on knowledge embrace a higher order impasse that is not solved by the standard division between “objective-inessential” and ‘subjectiveessential’ knowledge. Notwithstanding, this impasse opens some new perspectives on the issue.