Authors
Jordi Fernandez
University of Adelaide
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to defend the view that judgments based on episodic memory are immune to error through misidentification. I will put forward a proposal about the contents of episodic memories according to which a memory represents a perception of a past event. I will also offer a proposal about the contents of perceptual experiences according to which a perceptual experience represents some relations that its subject bears to events in the external world. The combination of the two views will yield the outcome that the subject is always an intentional object of her own memories: In episodic memory, one remembers being the subject whose extrinsic properties were experienced in some past perception. For that reason, one cannot misidentify oneself in memory unless one is having an inaccurate memory. Thus, the source of immunity to error through misidentification in memory lies in the nature of mnemonic content
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DOI 10.1007/s13164-014-0193-4
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References found in this work BETA

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
The Principles of Psychology.William James - 1890 - Dover Publications.
The Principles of Psychology.William James - 1890 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 11 (3):506-507.

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Citations of this work BETA

Is Remembering to Do a Special Kind of Memory?Thor Grünbaum & Søren Kyllingsbæk - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (2):385-404.
Mental Time Travel and Attention.Jonardon Ganeri - 2017 - Australasian Philosophical Review 1 (4):353-373.
First-Person Thought.Daniel Morgan & Léa Salje - 2020 - Analysis 80 (1):148-163.

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