Negation in Negationless Intuitionistic Mathematics

Philosophia Mathematica 31 (1):29-55 (2023)
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Abstract

The mathematician G.F.C. Griss is known for his program of negationless intuitionistic mathematics. Although Griss’s rejection of negation is regarded as characteristic of his philosophy, this is a consequence of an executability requirement that mental constructions presuppose agents’ executing corresponding mental activity. Restoring Griss’s executability requirement to a central role permits a more subtle characterization of the rejection of negation, according to which D. Nelson’s strong constructible negation is compatible with Griss’s principles. This exposes a ‘holographic’ theory of negation in negationless mathematics, in which a full theory of negation is ‘flattened’ in a putatively negationless setting.

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Thomas Ferguson
City University of New York

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Aboutness in Imagination.Franz Berto - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (8):1871-1886.
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