Philosophical Studies 162 (2):379-400 (2013)
AbstractThe aim of this paper is to provide an account of a certain variety of self-deception based on a model of self-knowledge. According to this model, one thinks that one has a belief on the basis of one’s grounds for that belief. If this model is correct, then our thoughts about which beliefs we have should be in accordance with our grounds for those beliefs. I suggest that the relevant variety of self deception is a failure of self-knowledge wherein the subject violates this epistemic obligation. I argue that construing this type of self-deception as a failure of selfknowledge explains two important aspects of it: The tension that we observe between the subject’s speech and her actions, and our inclination to hold the subject responsible for her condition. I compare this proposal with two other approaches to self-deception in the literature; intentionalism and motivationalism. Intentionalism explains the two aspects of self-deception but it runs into the so called ‘paradoxes’ of self-deception. Motivationalism avoids those paradoxes but it cannot explain the two aspects of self-deception.
Similar books and articles
What is the Role of the Self in Self-Deception?Richard Holton - 2001 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (1):53-69.
Self-Deception Vs. Self-Caused Deception: A Comment on Professor Mele.Robert Audi - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):104-104.
Understanding and Explaining Real Self-Deception.Alfred R. Mele - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):127-134.
Do the Self-Deceived Get What They Want?Eric Funkhouser - 2005 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):295-312.
The Emplotted Self: Self-Deception and Self-Knowledge.Rachel Brown - 2003 - Philosophical Papers 32 (3):279-300.
Self-Deception, Rationality, and the Self.Thomas Sturm - 2007 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 26 (3):73-95.
Self-Deceived About Self-Deception: An Evolutionary Analysis.Mario Heilmann - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):116-117.
Approaching Self-Deception: How Robert Audi and I Part Company.Alfred Mele - 2010 - Consciousness and Cognition 19 (3):745-750.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
On the Function of Self‐Deception.Vladimir Krstić - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy 29 (4):846-863.
An Agentive Non-Intentionalist Theory of Self-Deception.Kevin Lynch - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (6):779-798.
The Role of Pretense in the Process of Self-Deception.Xintong Wei - 2020 - Philosophical Explorations 23 (1):1-14.