Víctor Fernandez Castro
Institut Jean Nicod
Starting from Proust’s distinction between the self-attributive and self-evaluative views on metacognition, this paper presents a third view: self-mindshaping. Based on the notion of mindshaping as the core of social cognition, the self-mindshaping view contends that mindshaping abilities can be turned on one’s own mind. Against the self-attributive view, metacognition is not a matter of accessing representations to metarepresent them but of giving shape to those representations themselves. Against the self-evaluative view, metacognition is not blind to content but relies heavily on it. We characterize our view in terms of four issues that, according to Proust, distinguish the previous approaches, namely, whether metacognitive mechanisms are the same as those employed to access other minds, whether metacognitive control requires conceptual representation, whether metacognition is propositional, and whether metacognitive access is linked to mental action. After describing some of the mechanisms for self-mindshaping, we show how this view regards metacognition as grounded on social interaction mechanisms, conceptually driven, possibly, but not necessarily, propositional, and engaged in the practical regulation of mental states. Finally, we examine the prospects for the primacy of self-mindshaping as the primary metacognitive function. We argue that self-attributive processes typically subserve the practical goals emphasized by the mindshaping view, and that the evaluative role played by procedural metacognition can be grounded on social cues rather than on experiential feelings. Even if this is not enough to claim the primacy of self-mindshaping, it still appears as a third kind of metacognition, not reducible to the other two.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2020
DOI 10.1007/s11097-020-09658-2
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 63,360
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Consciousness Explained.Daniel C. Dennett - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):905-910.

View all 54 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Metacognition and Mindreading: One or Two Functions?Joëlle Proust - 2012 - In Michael Beran, Johannes Brandl, Josef Perner & Joëlle Proust (eds.), The foundations of metacognition. Oxford University Press. pp. 234.
The Complementarity of Mindshaping and Mindreading.Uwe Peters - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18 (3):533-549.
First-Person Folk Psychology: Mindreading or Mindshaping?Leon De Bruin - 2016 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 9 (1):170-183.
Replies to Commentaries.Ingar Brinck - 2013 - Infant and Child Development 22:111-117.
Does Metacognition Necessarily Involve Metarepresentation?Joëlle Proust - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (3):352-352.
Inner Speech and Metacognition: A Defense of the Commitment-Based Approach.Víctor Fernández Castro - 2019 - Logos and Episteme: An International Journal of Epistemology (3):245-261.
Dar forma a la mente.Víctor Fernandez Castro - 2015 - Thémata: Revista de Filosofía 51:433-442.
Epistemic Agency and Metacognition: An Externalist View.Joëlle Proust - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3):241-268.
Tadeusz Wieslaw Zawidzki: Mindshaping. [REVIEW]Joe Dewhurst - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (4):1165-1169.
Toward a Cognitive Neuroscience of Metacognition.Arthur P. Shimamura - 2000 - Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):313-323.


Added to PP index

Total views
25 ( #436,671 of 2,448,929 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #443,144 of 2,448,929 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes