Thought insertion and self-knowledge

Mind and Language 25 (1):66-88 (2010)
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Abstract

I offer an account of thought insertion based on a certain model of self-knowledge. I propose that subjects with thought insertion do not experience being committed to some of their own beliefs. A hypothesis about self-knowledge explains why. According to it, we form beliefs about our own beliefs on the basis of our evidence for them. First, I will argue that this hypothesis explains the fact that we feel committed to those beliefs which we are aware of. Then, I will point to one feature of schizophrenia that suggests that subjects with thought insertion may not be able to know their own beliefs in that way.

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Jordi Fernandez
University of Adelaide

Citations of this work

For-Me-Ness: What It is and What It is Not.Dan Zahavi & Uriah Kriegel - 2015 - In D. Dahlstrom, A. Elpidorou & W. Hopp (eds.), Philosophy of Mind and Phenomenology. Routledge. pp. 36-53.
Mental Action.Antonia Peacocke - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (6):e12741.
The Self Shows Up in Experience.Matt Duncan - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (2):299-318.
Delusion.Lisa Bortolotti - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Consciousness Explained.William G. Lycan - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (3):424.

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