Mind and Language 25 (1):66-88 (2010)
AbstractI offer an account of thought insertion based on a certain model of self-knowledge. I propose that subjects with thought insertion do not experience being committed to some of their own beliefs. A hypothesis about self-knowledge explains why. According to it, we form beliefs about our own beliefs on the basis of our evidence for them. First, I will argue that this hypothesis explains the fact that we feel committed to those beliefs which we are aware of. Then, I will point to one feature of schizophrenia that suggests that subjects with thought insertion may not be able to know their own beliefs in that way.
Similar books and articles
Fractured Phenomenologies: Thought Insertion, Inner Speech, and the Puzzle of Extraneity.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (4):369-401.
Does Consciousness Entail Subjectivity? The Puzzle of Thought Insertion.Alexandre Billon - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (2):291 - 314.
Thought Insertion and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification.Annalisa Coliva - 2002 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 9 (1):27-34.
Self-Ascription: Thought Insertion.George Graham - 2004 - In Jennifer Radden (ed.), The Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Companion. Oxford University Press. pp. 89.
Kant and the Phenomenon of Inserted Thoughts.Garry Young - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (6):823-837.
On Thought Insertion.Christoph Hoerl - 2001 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2-3):189-200.
The Epistemic Significance of Consensus.Aviezer Tucker - 2003 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 46 (4):501 – 521.
A Critical Review of G. Lynn Stephens & G. Graham's When Self-Consciousness Breaks. [REVIEW]Joëlle Proust - 2002 - Philosophical Psychology 15 (4):543 – 550.
A Role for Ownership and Authorship in the Analysis of Thought Insertion.Lisa Bortolotti & Matthew Broome - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (2):205-224.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
For-Me-Ness: What It is and What It is Not.Dan Zahavi & Uriah Kriegel - 2015 - In D. Dahlstrom, A. Elpidorou & W. Hopp (eds.), Philosophy of Mind and Phenomenology. Routledge. pp. 36-53.
The Self Shows Up in Experience.Matt Duncan - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (2):299-318.
Jaspers' Dilemma: The Psychopathological Challenge to Subjectivity Theories of Consciousness.Alexandre Billon & Uriah Kriegel - 2015 - In R. Gennaro (ed.), Disturbed Consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 29-54.
References found in this work
Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge.Richard Moran - 2001 - Princeton University Press.