The surprise exam paradox, rationality, and pragmatics: a simple game‐theoretic analysis

Journal of Economic Methodology 15 (3):285-299 (2008)

The surprise exam paradox has attracted the attention of prominent logicians, mathematicians and philosophers for decades. Although the paradox itself has been resolved at least since Quine, some aspects of it are still being discussed. In this paper we propose, following Sober, to translate the paradox into the language of game theory to clarify these aspects. Our main conclusions are that a much simpler game?theoretic analysis of the paradox is possible, which solves most of the puzzles related to it, and that this way of analysing the paradox can also throw light on our comprehension of the pragmatics of linguistic communication
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/13501780802321459
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 47,330
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Blackwell.
Logic and Conversation.H. Paul Grice - 1975 - In Maite Ezcurdia & Robert J. Stainton (eds.), The Semantics-Pragmatics Boundary in Philosophy. Broadview Press. pp. 47.
Blindspots.Roy A. Sorensen - 1988 - Oxford University Press.
Blindspots.Michael Levin - 1991 - Noûs 25 (3):389-392.

View all 32 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
422 ( #13,475 of 2,291,069 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #303,879 of 2,291,069 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes

Sign in to use this feature