Tarskian truth and the correspondence theory

Synthese 126 (1-2):123-147 (2001)
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Abstract

Tarski's theory of truth brings out the question of whether he intended his theory to be a correspondence theory of truth and whether, whatever his intentions, his theory is, in fact, a correspondence theory. The aim of this paper is to answer both questions. The answer to the first question depends on Tarski's relevant assertions on semantics and his conception of truth. In order to answer the second question Popper's and Davidson's interpretations of Tarski's truth theory are examined; to this end both Tarski's definition of truth in terms of satisfaction and the T-sentences are taken into account

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Tarski's definition and truth-makers.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 2004 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 126 (1-3):57-76.

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