Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (8):3-20 (2001)
The indirect realist theory of our knowledge of the external world which Russellian philosophers of mind have appealed to in formulating and defending a unique version of the mind-brain identity theory can be applied also to the formulation and defence of a unique version of functionalism. On the view that results, qualia turn out to be features which do not exist over and above the natural world , and are irreducibly subjective but are non-intrinsic properties of brain states . This view, which can be called ‘Hayekian functionalism’ , thus shows how we can combine the best insights of functionalism with the respect for the subjectivity of qualia which critics of functionalism claim it cannot accommodate
|Keywords||Metaphysics Mind Qualia Subjectivity Russell|
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