Pragmatic argumentation and the application of legal rules

Abstract

In law, the soundness of pragmatic argumentation in which a decision is defended by pointing to the consequences of the application of a particular legal rule, is often disputed. Some legal authors think that it is more of a rhetorical trick than a se rious attempt to convince in a rational way. Others think that it can be an acceptable way to defend a decision, provided that judges make explicit which value judgments underlie their decisions. I will sketch a pragma-dialectical framework for pragmati c argumentation and describe the criteria for sound pragmatic argumentation in a legal context.

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Eveline Feteris
University of Amsterdam

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References found in this work

Law’s Empire.Ronald Dworkin - 1986 - Harvard University Press.
Taking Rights Seriously.Ronald Dworkin - 1979 - Ethics 90 (1):121-130.
Taking Rights Seriously.Ronald Dworkin - 1979 - Mind 88 (350):305-309.
Legal reasoning and legal theory.Neil MacCormick (ed.) - 1978 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Taking Rights Seriously.Alan R. White - 1977 - Philosophical Quarterly 27 (109):379-380.

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