History and Philosophy of Logic 36 (1):29-38 (2015)

Elena Ficara
University of Cologne (PhD)
Some authors have claimed that Hegel's ‘determinate negation’ should be distinguished from ‘logical’ or ‘formal’ negation, that is, from a view of negation as a contradictory forming operator. In contrast, I argue that dialectical determinate negation involves a view of negation as a contradictory forming operator, and can therefore count as formal negation in every respect. However, as it is clear in contemporary glutty semantics of negation, one may distinguish between different accounts of the relationship between negation, contradiction and content. I suggest that, differently from classical negation, and as glutty negation, dialectical negation has partial content.
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DOI 10.1080/01445340.2014.940698
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Spandrels of Truth.J. C. Beall - 2009 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Doubt Truth to Be a Liar.Graham Priest - 2005 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

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Hegel and the Consequentia Mirabilis.Elena Ficara - 2018 - History and Philosophy of Logic 39 (4):357-364.

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