Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):105 – 116 (2006)

Deontic reasoning is reasoning about permission and obligation: what one may do and what one must do, respectively. Conceivably, people could reason about deontic matters using a purely formal deontic calculus. I review evidence from a range of psychological experiments suggesting that this is not the case. Instead, I argue that deontic reasoning is supported by a collection of dissociable cognitive adaptations for solving adaptive problems that likely would have confronted ancestral humans.
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DOI 10.1080/13869790500492714
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References found in this work BETA

The Modularity of Mind.Robert Cummins & Jerry Fodor - 1983 - Philosophical Review 94 (1):101.

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Is the Public Incompetent? Compared to Whom? About What?Gerald Gaus - 2008 - Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 20 (3):291-311.

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