Can program explanation confer ontological rights for the Cornell realist variety of moral realism?

Abstract
In his Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics, Alex Miller considered a defence that might be made on behalf of the moral non-reductive naturalist in response to Gilbert Harman’s explanatory objection, a response that uses Frank Jackson’s and Philip Pettit’s account of ‘program explanation.’ However, Miller went on to argue that program explanation fails to successfully defend the moral non-reductive naturalist against Harman’s objection. Recently Paul Bloomfield and Mark Nelson have argued against Miller that program explanation does in fact successfully defend the moral non-reductive naturalist, because the only full explanation of why the relevant counterfactual, discussed in this thesis, is true requires the use of program explanation. Following Miller, I argue that the fact that counterfactuals are context sensitive undermines the argument developed by Nelson, and I also attempt to undermine Bloomfield’s recent defence of Nelson. Contrary to Bloomfield and Nelson, program explanation is not required in order to explain why the relevant counterfactual is true, so that Harman’s explanatory objection is left intact
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,727
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Moral Realism and Program Explanation.Mark T. Nelson - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (3):417 – 428.
Mathematical Explanations Of Empirical Facts, And Mathematical Realism.Aidan Lyon - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):559-578.
Program Explanations and Causal Relevance.Sven Walter - 2005 - Acta Analytica 20 (36):32-47.
Programs in the Explanation of Behavior.Robert C. Cummins - 1977 - Philosophy of Science 44 (June):269-87.
Some Aspects of Explanation in Boškovič.Zvonimir Čuljak - 1995 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9 (1):73-84.
Moral Explanations.Neil Sinclair - 2013 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Blackwell.
Added to PP index
2011-05-26

Total downloads
848 ( #1,162 of 2,197,335 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #298,877 of 2,197,335 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature