Authors
Hartry Field
New York University
Abstract
Any theory of truth must find a way around Curry’s paradox, and there are well-known ways to do so. This paper concerns an apparently analogous paradox, about validity rather than truth, which JC Beall and Julien Murzi call the v-Curry. They argue that there are reasons to want a common solution to it and the standard Curry paradox, and that this rules out the solutions to the latter offered by most “naive truth theorists.” To this end they recommend a radical solution to both paradoxes, involving a substructural logic, in particular, one without structural contraction. In this paper I argue that substructuralism is unnecessary. Diagnosing the “v-Curry” is complicated because of a multiplicity of readings of the principles it relies on. But these principles are not analogous to the principles of naive truth, and taken together, there is no reading of them that should have much appeal to anyone who has absorbed the morals of both the ordinary Curry paradox and the second incompleteness theorem.
Keywords Curry paradox   substructural logic   validity
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DOI 10.1215/00294527-3699865
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References found in this work BETA

Outline of a Theory of Truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
Two Flavors of Curry’s Paradox.Jc Beall & Julien Murzi - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy 110 (3):143-165.

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Citations of this work BETA

Logical Partisanhood.Jack Woods - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (5):1203-1224.
Generalized Revenge.Julien Murzi & Lorenzo Rossi - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (1):153-177.
Faithfulness for Naive Validity.Ulf Hlobil - 2019 - Synthese 196 (11):4759-4774.

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