Epistemology without metaphysics

Philosophical Studies 143 (2):249 - 290 (2009)
Abstract
The paper outlines a view of normativity that combines elements of relativism and expressivism, and applies it to normative concepts in epistemology. The result is a kind of epistemological anti-realism, which denies that epistemic norms can be (in any straightforward sense) correct or incorrect; it does allow some to be better than others, but takes this to be goal-relative and is skeptical of the existence of best norms. It discusses the circularity that arises from the fact that we need to use epistemic norms to gather the facts with which to evaluate epistemic norms; relatedly, it discusses how epistemic norms can rationally evolve. It concludes with some discussion of the impact of this view on "ground level" epistemology.
Keywords Expressivism  Relativism  Norms  Epistemic realism  Justification  Truth
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-009-9338-1
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References found in this work BETA
Thinking How to Live.Allan Gibbard - 2003 - Harvard University Press.
Essays in Quasi-Realism.Simon Blackburn - 1993 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Rational Self-Doubt and the Failure of Closure.Joshua Schechter - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):428-452.
Pluralism in Logic.Hartry Field - 2009 - Review of Symbolic Logic 2 (2):342-359.
Reverse Engineering Epistemic Evaluations.Sinan Dogramaci - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):513-530.
Subjective Disagreement.Beddor Bob - forthcoming - Noûs.

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