Joint attention in joint action

Philosophical Psychology 26 (4):571-87 (2013)
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Abstract

In this paper, we investigate the role of intention and joint attention in joint actions. Depending on the shared intentions the agents have, we distinguish between joint path-goal actions and joint final-goal actions. We propose an instrumental account of basic joint action analogous to a concept of basic action and argue that intentional joint attention is a basic joint action. Furthermore, we discuss the functional role of intentional joint attention for successful cooperation in complex joint actions. Anika Fiebich is PhD student in Philosophy at the Ruhr-University Bochum, Germany. Shaun Gallagher is Lilian and Morrie Moss Professor of Philosophy at the University of Memphis, USA.

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Shaun Gallagher
University of Memphis

References found in this work

Collective Intentions and Actions.John Searle - 1990 - In Philip R. Cohen Jerry Morgan & Martha Pollack, Intentions in Communication. MIT Press. pp. 401-415.
Shared cooperative activity.Michael E. Bratman - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):327-341.
Shared intention.Michael E. Bratman - 1993 - Ethics 104 (1):97-113.

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