Recklessness and Uncertainty: Jackson Cases and Merely Apparent Asymmetry

Journal of Moral Philosophy 16 (4):391-413 (2019)

Authors
Claire Field
University of St. Andrews
Abstract
Is normative uncertainty like factual uncertainty? Should it have the same effects on our actions? Some have thought not. Those who defend an asymmetry between normative and factual uncertainty typically do so as part of the claim that our moral beliefs in general are irrelevant to both the moral value and the moral worth of our actions. Here I use the consideration of Jackson cases to challenge this view, arguing that we can explain away the apparent asymmetries between normative and factual uncertainty by considering the particular features of the cases in greater detail. Such consideration shows that, in fact, normative and factual uncertainty are equally relevant to moral assessment.
Keywords Jackson Cases  normative uncertainty  moral recklessness  moral appraisal
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DOI 10.1163/17455243-20182687
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Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2010 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. Oxford University Press. pp. 183--217.
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Running Risks Morally.Brian Weatherson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (1):141-163.

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