In J. C. Beall (ed.), Revenge of the Liar: New Essays on the Paradox. Oxford University Press (2007)

Authors
Hartry Field
New York University
Abstract
It is “the received wisdom” that any intuitively natural and consistent resolution of a class of semantic paradoxes immediately leads to other paradoxes just as bad as the first. This is often called the “revenge problem”. Some proponents of the received wisdom draw the conclusion that there is no hope of any natural treatment that puts all the paradoxes to rest: we must either live with the existence of paradoxes that we are unable to treat, or adopt artificial and ad hoc means to avoid them. Others (“dialetheists”) argue that we can put the paradoxes to rest, but only by licensing the acceptance of some contradictions (presumably in a paraconsistent logic that prevents the contradictions from spreading everywhere).
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Two Flavors of Curry’s Paradox.Jc Beall & Julien Murzi - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy 110 (3):143-165.
Generalized Revenge.Julien Murzi & Lorenzo Rossi - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (1):153-177.
Belief and Indeterminacy.Michael Caie - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (1):1-54.
Non-Classical Metatheory for Non-Classical Logics.Andrew Bacon - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (2):335-355.

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