Can mental representations be triggering causes?

Consciousness and Emotion 4 (1):43-61 (2003)
Abstract
Fred Dretske?s (1988) account of the causal role of intentional mental states was widely criticized for missing the target: he explained why a type of intentional state causes the type of bodily motion it does rather than some other type, when what we wanted was an account of how the intentional properties of these states play a causal role in each singular causal relation with a token bodily motion. I argue that the non-reductive metaphysics that Dretske defends for his account of behavior can be extended to the case of intentional states, and that this extension provides a way to show how intentional properties can play the causal role that we wanted explained
Keywords *Behavior Analysis  *Causal Analysis  *Consciousness States  *Intention  *Mental Models  Behavior  Metaphysics  Motor Processes
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Mental Causation: Sustaining and Dynamic.Robert N. Audi - 1993 - In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.
Physicalism and the Problem of Mental Causation.R. Philip Buckley - 2001 - Journal of Philosophical Research 26 (January):155-174.
Dretske on the Causation of Behavior.Constantine Sandis - 2008 - Behavior and Philosophy 36:71-86.
Mental Causation and Explanatory Exclusion.Sara Worley - 1993 - Erkenntnis 39 (3):333-358.
Mental Causation and Searle's Impossible Conception of Unconscious Intentionality.Anthonie W. M. Meijers - 2000 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 8 (2):155-170.
Two Routes to Narrow Content: Both Dead Ends.Pat A. Manfredi - 1993 - Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):3-22.
Making Room for Bodily Intentionality.Todd D. Janke - 2008 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):51-68.
Mental Events as Structuring Causes of Behavior.Fred Dretske - 1993 - In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

78 ( #67,493 of 2,172,038 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #325,337 of 2,172,038 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums