Mind and Language 30 (5):603-627 (2015)

Authors
Mark Phelan
Lawrence University
Abstract
Philosophical tradition has long held that free will is necessary for moral responsibility. We report experimental results that show that the folk do not think free will is necessary for moral responsibility. Our results also suggest that experimental investigation of the relationship is ill served by a focus on incompatibilism versus compatibilism. We propose an alternative framework for empirical moral psychology in which judgments of free will and moral responsibility can vary independently in response to many factors. We also suggest that, in response to some factors, the necessity relation may run from responsibility to free will
Keywords free will  moral psychology  moral responsibility  compatibilism  incompatibilism  experimental psychology  necessary connection
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DOI 10.1111/mila.12092
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References found in this work BETA

An Essay on Free Will.Peter Van Inwagen - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?Jason Turner, Eddy Nahmias, Stephen Morris & Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):28-53.

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Citations of this work BETA

Moral Psychology: Empirical Approaches.John Doris & Stephen Stich - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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