Semantic externalism and the mechanics of thought
Minds and Machines 19 (1):1-24 (2009)
Abstract
I review a widely accepted argument to the conclusion that the contents of our beliefs, desires and other mental states cannot be causally efficacious in a classical computational model of the mind. I reply that this argument rests essentially on an assumption about the nature of neural structure that we have no good scientific reason to accept. I conclude that computationalism is compatible with wide semantic causal efficacy, and suggest how the computational model might be modified to accommodate this possibility.Author's Profile
DOI
10.1007/s11023-008-9114-6
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Citations of this work
Are Computational Transitions Sensitive to Semantics?Michael Rescorla - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):703-721.
Do Computers "Have Syntax, But No Semantics"?Jaroslav Peregrin - 2021 - Minds and Machines 31 (2):305-321.
References found in this work
Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1987 - MIT Press.