The Fallacy of the Homuncular Fallacy

Carrie Figdor
University of Iowa
A leading theoretical framework for naturalistic explanation of mind holds that we explain the mind by positing progressively "stupider" capacities ("homunculi") until the mind is "discharged" by means of capacities that are not intelligent at all. The so-called homuncular fallacy involves violating this procedure by positing the same capacities at subpersonal levels. I argue that the homuncular fallacy is not a fallacy, and that modern-day homunculi are idle posits. I propose an alternative view of what naturalism requires that reflects how the cognitive sciences are actually integrating mind and matter.
Keywords homuncular functionalism  homuncular fallacy  psychological explanation  naturalizing the mind
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The Language of Thought.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.

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