Envy's Non-Innocent Victims

Journal of Philosophy of Emotion 1 (1):1-22 (2019)
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Abstract

Envy has often been seen as a vice and the envied as its victims. I suggest that this plausible view has an important limitation: the envied sometimes actively try to provoke envy. They may, thus, be non-innocent victims. Having argued for this thesis, I draw some practical implications.

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Iskra Fileva
University of Colorado, Boulder

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References found in this work

The metaphysics of morals.Immanuel Kant - 1797 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Mary J. Gregor.
The Moralistic Fallacy: On the 'Appropriateness' of Emotions.Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson - 2000 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):65-90.
The Moralistic Fallacy.Daniel Jacobson - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):65-90.
Action, Emotion and Will.Anthony Kenny - 1963 - Philosophy 39 (149):277-278.

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