Just Another Article on Moore’s Paradox, But We Don’t Believe That

Synthese 196 (12):5153-5167 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

We present counterexamples to the widespread assumption that Moorean sentences cannot be rationally asserted. We then explain why Moorean assertions of the sort we discuss do not incur the irrationality charge. Our argument involves an appeal to the dual-process theory of the mind and a contrast between the conditions for ascribing beliefs to oneself and the conditions for making assertions about independently existing states of affairs. We conclude by contrasting beliefs of the sort we discuss with the structurally similar but rationally impermissible beliefs of certain psychiatric patients.

Similar books and articles

Moore’s Paradox in Belief and Desire.John N. Williams - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (1):1-23.
Moores Paradox, Behaupten, Urteilen.Christoph C. Pfisterer - 2008 - Conceptus: Zeitschrift Fur Philosophie 37 (91):41-62.
Moore’s Paradox and the Priority of Belief Thesis.John N. Williams - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1117-1138.
A Moorean Paradox of Desire.David Wall - 2012 - Philosophical Explorations 15 (1):63-84.
Self-Knowledge, Rationality and Moore’s Paradox.Jordi Fernández - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):533-556.
Moore's Paradox.Krista Lawlor & John Perry - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):421 – 427.
Belief, Assertion and Moore’s Paradox.Timothy Chan - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (3):395-414.
Moore's Paradox and Akratic Belief.Eugene Chislenko - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3):669-690.
On Russell's Vulnerability to Russell's Paradox.James Levine - 2001 - History and Philosophy of Logic 22 (4):207-231.

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-02-07

Downloads
223 (#54,170)

6 months
42 (#24,532)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Iskra Fileva
University of Colorado, Boulder

Citations of this work

Add more citations

References found in this work

Philosophical Investigations.Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein - 1953 - New York, NY, USA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Thinking, Fast and Slow.Daniel Kahneman - 2011 - New York: New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Philosophical investigations.Ludwig Wittgenstein & G. E. M. Anscombe - 1953 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 161:124-124.

View all 43 references / Add more references