Against libertarianism

Philosophical Studies 166 (3):475-493 (2013)
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Abstract

The so-called Mind argument aims at the conclusion that agents act freely only if determinism is true. The soundness of this argument entails the falsity of libertarianism, the two-part thesis that agents act freely, and free action and determinism are incompatible. In this paper, I offer a new formulation of the Mind argument. I argue that it is true by definition that if an agent acts freely, either (i) nothing nomologically grounds an agent’s acting freely, or (ii) the consequence argument for incompatibilism is unsound. I define the notion of nomological grounding, and argue that unless an agent’s acting freely is nomologically grounded, unacceptable consequences follow. I then argue that if agents act freely and the consequence argument is sound, a vicious regress ensues. I conclude by considering the libertarian’s dialectical options

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Alicia Finch
Northern Illinois University

Citations of this work

Laws of Nature and Free Will.Pedro Merlussi - 2017 - Dissertation, Durham University

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References found in this work

A World of States of Affairs.D. M. Armstrong - 1996 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
An Essay on Free Will.Peter van Inwagen - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.
On what grounds what.Jonathan Schaffer - 2009 - In Ryan Wasserman, David Manley & David Chalmers (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. pp. 347-383.
The Significance of Free Will.Robert Kane - 1996 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.
Metaphysical Dependence: Grounding and Reduction.Gideon Rosen - 2010 - In Bob Hale & Aviv Hoffmann (eds.), Modality: metaphysics, logic, and epistemology. qnew York: Oxford University Press. pp. 109-135.

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