Confusion of Tongues: A Theory of Normative Language

New York, US: Oup Usa (2014)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Can normative words like "good," "ought," and "reason" be defined in non-normative terms? Stephen Finlay argues that they can, advancing a new theory of the meaning of this language and providing pragmatic explanations of the specially problematic features of its moral and deliberative uses which comprise the puzzles of metaethics

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 80,057

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Chapters

Categorical and Final

This chapter examines two different challenges posed by moral absolutists to relational semantics for normative language: (1) the character of moral claims as ‘categorical imperatives’, and (2) claims about intrinsic or final value. First, categoricity is analyzed as a pragmatic phenomenon... see more

Conclusion

The commitments and implications of the end-relational theory are examined for linguistics, metaphysics, psychology, epistemology, ethics, and metaethics. While normative language often refers to genuine facts, the normativity of these facts is relative to perspectives of desire. This supp... see more

Similar books and articles

Explaining Reasons.Stephen Finlay - 2012 - Deutsches Jahrbuch Fuer Philosophie 4:112-126.
The Pragmatics of Normative Disagreement.Stephen Finlay - 2014 - In Guy Fletcher & Michael Ridge (eds.), Having It Both Ways: Hybrid Theories and Modern Metaethics. Oxford University Press. pp. 124-148.
Whither Stakeholder Theory? A Guide for the Perplexed Revisited.John Hasnas - 2013 - Journal of Business Ethics 112 (1):47-57.
What not to expect from the pragmatic turn in political theory.Eva Erman & Niklas Möller - 2014 - European Journal of Political Theory (2):1474885114537635.
The Language of Value.Ray Lepley - 1957 - Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press.
A logical typology of normative systems.Berislav Žarnić - 2010 - Journal of Applied Ethics and Philosophy 2 (1):30-40.
Why Ethics is Part of Philosophy.Stephen Darwall - 1999 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 1:19-28.

Analytics

Added to PP
2014-11-06

Downloads
94 (#140,967)

6 months
3 (#241,676)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Stephen Finlay
Australian Catholic University

Citations of this work

Skepticism about Ought Simpliciter.Derek Clayton Baker - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13.
Defining Normativity.Stephen Finlay - 2019 - In Kevin Toh, David Plunkett & Scott Shapiro (eds.), Dimensions of Normativity: New Essays on Metaethics and Jurisprudence. Oxford University Press. pp. 62-104.
Which Reasons? Which Rationality?Daniel Fogal & Alex Worsnip - 2021 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8.

View all 120 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

"Ought" and the Perspective of the Agent.Benjamin Kiesewitter - 2011 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 5 (3):1-24.

Add more references