Oup Usa (2014)

Authors
Stephen Finlay
Australian Catholic University
Abstract
Can normative words like "good," "ought," and "reason" be defined in non-normative terms? Stephen Finlay argues that they can, advancing a new theory of the meaning of this language and providing pragmatic explanations of the specially problematic features of its moral and deliberative uses which comprise the puzzles of metaethics
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Reprint years 2016, 2017
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ISBN(s) 9780199347490   0199347492   9780190649630   0190649631
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Chapters BETA
Categorical and Final

This chapter examines two different challenges posed by moral absolutists to relational semantics for normative language: (1) the character of moral claims as ‘categorical imperatives’, and (2) claims about intrinsic or final value. First, categoricity is analyzed as a pragmatic phenomenon... see more

Conclusion

The commitments and implications of the end-relational theory are examined for linguistics, metaphysics, psychology, epistemology, ethics, and metaethics. While normative language often refers to genuine facts, the normativity of these facts is relative to perspectives of desire. This supp... see more

References found in this work BETA

"Ought" and the Perspective of the Agent.Benjamin Kiesewitter - 2011 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 5 (3):1-24.

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Citations of this work BETA

Skepticism About Ought Simpliciter.Derek Clayton Baker - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13.
Reasons, Reason, and Context.Daniel Fogal - 2016 - In Errol Lord & Barry Maguire (eds.), Weighing Reasons. Oxford University Press.
The Authority of Formality.Jack Woods - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13.
The Sense of Incredibility in Ethics.Nicholas Laskowski - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (1):93-115.

View all 102 citations / Add more citations

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