Philosophy of Science 27 (4):391-404 (1960)

Experimental observations are often taken in order to assist in making a choice between relevant hypotheses ∼ H and H. The power of observations in this decision is here metrically defined by information-theoretic concepts and Bayes' theorem. The exact (or maximum power) of a new observation to increase or decrease Pr(H) the prior probability that H is true; the power of that observation to modify the total amount of uncertainty involved in the choice between ∼ H and H: the power of a new observation to reduce uncertainty toward the ideal amount, zero; all these powers are systematically shown to be exact metrical functions of Pr(H) and Pr(o/H)/Pr(o)-1 where the numerator is the likelihood of the new observation given H, and the denominator is the "expectedness" of the observation
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DOI 10.1086/287766
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References found in this work BETA

Degree of Factual Support.John G. Kemeny & Paul Oppenheim - 1952 - Philosophy of Science 19 (4):307-324.
Statistics, Pragmatics, Induction.C. West Churchman - 1948 - Philosophy of Science 15 (3):249-268.
A Theory of Evidence.Nicholas Rescher - 1958 - Philosophy of Science 25 (1):83-94.
Irreversibility; or, Entropy Since 1905.Karl R. Popper - 1957 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 8 (30):151-155.
The Two Concepts of Probability.Rudolph Carnap - 1944 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 5:513.

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