Do we have reasons to do as we believe we ought to do?
In M. Silar & F. S. Augier (eds.), Practical Rationality: Intentionality, Normativity and Reflexivity. Ziur Navarra. pp. 65-79 (2009)
Authors |
|
Abstract |
Suppose you believe you ought to A. Would a failure of yours to A imply that you are not entirely as you ought to be? Ought you to A if you believe you to ought to A? This paper argues for a qualified version of this claim. It is qualified in two ways. First, I assume that this can be so only if ‘if you believe you ought to A’ appears within the scope of ‘you ought’. That is, you ought to [if you believe you ought to A, then A.] Second, I argue that you ought to do as you believe you ought to only as far as it goes; that is, unless there are exceptional reasons not to do so. In this sense, we have a pro tanto reason to do, as we believe we ought to do.
|
Keywords | ought-intention coherence Enkrasia rationality reasons |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
Buy the book |
Find it on Amazon.com
|
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Moral Reasons, Epistemic Reasons, and Rationality.Alex Worsnip - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (263):341-361.
Reasons and Rationality.Jonathan Way - forthcoming - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford University Press.
The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence.Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):3-44.
Autonomous Reasons for Intending.Randolph Clarke - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):191 – 212.
Reasons for Action, Acting for Reasons, and Rationality.Maria Alvarez - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3293-3310.
How Reasons Are Sensitive to Available Evidence.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2018 - In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 90-114.
Reasons and Theoretical Rationality.Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - In Daniel Star (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford University Press.
Intentions and the Reasons for Which We Act.Ulrike Heuer - 2014 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (3pt3):291-315.
Moral Rationalism and the Normative Status of Desiderative Coherence.Patricia Marino - 2010 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (2):227-252.
Two Accounts of the Normativity of Rationality.Jonathan Way - 2009 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 4 (1):1-9.
Knowledge, Explanation, and Motivating Reasons.Dustin Locke - 2015 - American Philosophical Quarterly 52:215-232.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2016-11-17
Total views
1 ( #1,540,420 of 2,499,864 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #417,749 of 2,499,864 )
2016-11-17
Total views
1 ( #1,540,420 of 2,499,864 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #417,749 of 2,499,864 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.