Do we have reasons to do as we believe we ought to do?

In M. Silar & F. S. Augier (eds.), Practical Rationality: Intentionality, Normativity and Reflexivity. Ziur Navarra. pp. 65-79 (2009)
Abstract
Suppose you believe you ought to A. Would a failure of yours to A imply that you are not entirely as you ought to be? Ought you to A if you believe you to ought to A? This paper argues for a qualified version of this claim. It is qualified in two ways. First, I assume that this can be so only if ‘if you believe you ought to A’ appears within the scope of ‘you ought’. That is, you ought to [if you believe you ought to A, then A.] Second, I argue that you ought to do as you believe you ought to only as far as it goes; that is, unless there are exceptional reasons not to do so. In this sense, we have a pro tanto reason to do, as we believe we ought to do.
Keywords ought-intention coherence  Enkrasia  rationality  reasons
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