Metaethical Contextualism Defended

Ethics 121 (1):7-36 (2010)
Abstract
We defend a contextualist account of deontic judgments as relativized both to (i) information and to (ii) standards or ends, against recent objections that turn on practices of moral disagreement. Kolodny & MacFarlane argue that information-relative contextualism cannot accommodate the connection between deliberation and advice; we suggest in response that they misidentify the basic concerns of deliberating agents. For pragmatic reasons, semantic assessments of normative claims sometimes are evaluations of propositions other than those asserted. Weatherson, Schroeder and others have raised parallel objections to standard-relative contextualism; we argue for a parallel solution.
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How Reasons Are Sensitive to Available Evidence.Benjamin Kiesewetter - forthcoming - In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford University Press.
'Ought' and Control.Matthew Chrisman - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):433-451.
Evidence Sensitivity in Weak Necessity Deontic Modals.Alex Silk - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (4):691-723.

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