Metaethical Contextualism Defended

Ethics 121 (1):7-36 (2010)

Authors
Stephen Finlay
Australian Catholic University
Gunnar Björnsson
Stockholm University
Abstract
We defend a contextualist account of deontic judgments as relativized both to (i) information and to (ii) standards or ends, against recent objections that turn on practices of moral disagreement. Kolodny & MacFarlane argue that information-relative contextualism cannot accommodate the connection between deliberation and advice; we suggest in response that they misidentify the basic concerns of deliberating agents. For pragmatic reasons, semantic assessments of normative claims sometimes are evaluations of propositions other than those asserted. Weatherson, Schroeder and others have raised parallel objections to standard-relative contextualism; we argue for a parallel solution.
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References found in this work BETA

Thinking How to Live.Allan Gibbard - 2003 - Harvard University Press.
Ethical Intuitionism.Michael Huemer - 2005 - Palgrave Macmillan.
Thinking How to Live.D. O. Brink - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):267-272.
Epistemic Modals Are Assessment-Sensitive.John MacFarlane - 2011 - In Andy Egan & B. Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality. Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Flexible Contextualism About Deontic Modals: A Puzzle About Information-Sensitivity.J. L. Dowell - 2013 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (2-3):149-178.
A Puzzle About Enkratic Reasoning.Jonathan Way - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.

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