On Ideas: Aristotle's Criticism of Plato's Theory of Forms

Oxford University Press (1993)
Abstract
The Peri ide^on is the only work in which Aristotle systematically sets out and criticizes arguments for the existence of Platonic forms. Gail Fine presents the first full-length treatment in English of this important but neglected work. She asks how, and how well, Aristotle understands Plato's theory of forms, and why and with what justification he favors an alternative metaphysical scheme. She examines the significance of the Peri ide^on for some central questions about Plato's theory of forms--whether, for example, there are forms corresponding to every property or only to some, and if only to some, then to which ones; whether forms are universals, particulars or both; and whether they are meanings, properties or both. Fine also provides a general discussion of Plato's theory of forms, and of our evidence about the Peri ide^on and its date, scope, and aims. While she pays careful attention to the details of the text, she also relates it to contemporary philosophical concerns. The book will be valuable for anyone interested in metaphysics ancient or modern
Keywords Form (Philosophy  Universals (Philosophy
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Reprint years 1995
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Call number B491.F63.F56 1993
ISBN(s) 0198239491     9780198235491
DOI 10.2307/2219618
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The Third Man Argument.D. T. J. Bailey - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (4):666-681.
What's Wrong with Ostrich Nominalism?Howard Peacock - 2009 - Philosophical Papers 38 (2):183-217.
How Should I Be? A Defense of Platonic Rational Egoism.Jyl Gentzler - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):39-67.

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