Quantifier Variance Dissolved

Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 82:289-307 (2018)
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Abstract

Quantifier variance faces a number of difficulties. In this paper we first formulate the view as holding that the meanings of the quantifiers may vary, and that languages using different quantifiers may be charitably translated into each other. We then object to the view on the basis of four claims: (i) quantifiers cannot vary their meaning extensionally by changing the domain of quantification; (ii) quantifiers cannot vary their meaning intensionally without collapsing into logical pluralism; (iii) quantifier variance is not an ontological doctrine; (iv) quantifier variance is not compatible with charitable translation and as such is internally inconsistent. In light of these troubles, we recommend the dissolution of quantifier variance and suggest that the view be laid to rest.

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Author's Profile

Suki Finn
Royal Holloway University of London

References found in this work

Logical pluralism.Jc Beall & Greg Restall - 2000 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (4):475 – 493.
Modal fictionalism.Gideon Rosen - 1990 - Mind 99 (395):327-354.
Quantifier variance and realism.Eli Hirsch - 2002 - Philosophical Issues 12 (1):51-73.
Science without Numbers.Michael D. Resnik - 1983 - Noûs 17 (3):514-519.
Neo-Fregean ontology.Matti Eklund - 2006 - Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):95-121.

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