Review: Epistemic Instrumentalism, Exceeding Our Grasp [Book Review]

Philosophical Studies 137 (1):135-139 (2008)
Authors
Arthur Fine
University of Washington
Abstract
In the concluding chapter of Exceeding our Grasp Kyle Stanford outlines a positive response to the central issue raised brilliantly by his book, the problem of unconceived alternatives. This response, called " epistemic instrumentalism ", relies on a distinction between instrumental and literal belief. We examine this distinction and with it the viability of Stanford's instrumentalism, which may well be another case of exceeding our grasp
Keywords Antirealism  Eliminative inference  Instrumentalism  Pessimistic induction  Realism
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