The Property of Rationality: A Guide to What Rationality Requires?

Philosophical Studies:1-24 (2017)
Authors
Julian Fink
Universität Bayreuth
Abstract
Can we employ the property of rationality in establishing what rationality requires? According to a central and formal thesis of John Broome’s work on rational requirements, the answer is ‘no’ – at least if we expect a precise answer. In particular, Broome argues that (i) the property of full rationality (i.e. whether or not you are fully rational) is independent of whether we formulate conditional requirements of rationality as having a wide or a narrow logical scope. That is, (ii) by replacing a wide-scope requirement with a corresponding narrow-scope requirement (or vice versa), we do not alter the situations in which a person is fully rational. As a consequence, (iii) the property of full rationality is unable to guide us in determining whether a rational requirement has a wide or a narrow logical scope. We cannot resolve the wide/narrow scope debate by appealing to a theory of fully rational attitudes. This paper argues that (i), (ii) and (iii) are incorrect. Replacing a wide- with a corresponding narrow-scope requirement (or vice versa) can alter the set of circumstances in which a person is fully rational. The property of full rationality is therefore not independent of whether we formulate conditional requirements of rationality as having a wide or a narrow logical scope. As a consequence, the property of full rationality can guide us in determining what rationality requires – even in cases where we expect a precise answer.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11098-017-0858-9
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Circularity, Naturalism, and Desire-Based Reasons.Attila Tanyi - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (4):451-470.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Unifying the Requirements of Rationality.Andrew Reisner - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (3):243-260.
Normative Lessons for the Scope Debate of Rational Requirements.Julian Fink - 2016 - Balkan Journal of Philosophy 8 (2):99-106.
Wide or Narrow Scope?John Broome - 2007 - Mind 116 (462):359-370.
Narrow-Scoping for Wide-Scopers.Alex Worsnip - 2015 - Synthese 192 (8):2617-2646.
Wide and Narrow Scope.Sam Shpall - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (3):717-736.
Asymmetry, Scope, and Rational Consistency.Julian Fink - 2010 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 10 (2):109-130.
Instrumental Rationality, Symmetry and Scope.John Brunero - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (1):125-140.
The Scope of Rational Requirements.John Brunero - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (238):28-49.
The Ladder of Rationality.Julian Fink - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (3):787-791.
State or Process Requirements?Niko Kolodny - 2007 - Mind 116 (462):371-385.
Why Be Rational?Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2016-10-24

Total downloads
202 ( #27,376 of 2,293,848 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
65 ( #5,457 of 2,293,848 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature