The Selves and the Shoemaker: Psychopaths, Moral Judgement, and Responsibility

Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (s1):125–133 (2011)
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Abstract

David Shoemaker argues from (A) psychopaths’ emotional deficiency, to (B) their insensitivity to moral reasons, to (C) their lack of criminal responsibility. This response observes three important ambiguities in this argument, involving the interpretation of (1) psychopaths’ emotional deficit, (2) their insensitivity to reasons, and (3) their moral judgements. Resolving these ambiguities presents Shoemaker with a dilemma: his argument either equivocates or it is falsified by the empirical evidence. An alternative perspective on psychopaths’ moral and criminal responsibility is proposed.

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Stephen Finlay
University of Southern California

Citations of this work

Psychopathy: Neurohype and Its Consequences.Jarkko Jalava & Stephanie Griffiths - 2021 - In Luca Malatesti, John McMillan & Predrag Šustar, Psychopathy: Its Uses, Validity and Status. Cham: Springer. pp. 79-98.

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References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
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Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1984 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
Why We Should Reject S.Derek Parfit - 1984 - In Reasons and Persons. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

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