Acta Analytica 28 (4):471-482 (2013)
This paper argues that practical reasoning is a mental process which leads a person from a set of existent mental states to an intention. In Section 1, I defend this view against two other proposals according to which practical reasoning either concludes in an action itself or in a normative belief. Section 2 discusses the correctness of practical reasoning and explains how the correctness of instrumental reasoning can be explained by the logical relations that hold between the contents of the mental states. In Section 3, I explore the correctness of normative practical reasoning. I conclude with the sceptical view that correct practical reasoning cannot require us to intend to do what we believe we ought to do.
|Keywords||Practical reasoning Normative reasoning Instrumental reasoning Correct reasoning|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Reasons and Motivation.Derek Parfit - 1997 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1):99–130.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Progress Towards a Formal Theory of Practical Reasoning: Problems and Prospects.Richmond H. Thomason - unknown
Educating for Practical Reasoning.Thomas Magnell - 2001 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 11:233-239.
What I Learned in the Lunch Room About Assertion and Practical Reasoning.Rachel McKinnon - 2012 - Logos and Episteme 3 (4):565-569.
Added to index2012-12-11
Total downloads109 ( #46,121 of 2,177,980 )
Recent downloads (6 months)11 ( #28,011 of 2,177,980 )
How can I increase my downloads?