What ought probably means, and why you can't detach it

Synthese 177 (1):67 - 89 (2010)
Abstract
Some intuitive normative principles raise vexing 'detaching problems' by their failure to license modus ponens. I examine three such principles (a self-reliance principle and two different instrumental principles) and recent stategies employed to resolve their detaching problems. I show that solving these problems necessitates postulating an indefinitely large number of senses for 'ought'. The semantics for 'ought' that is standard in linguistics offers a unifying strategy for solving these problems, but I argue that an alternative approach combining an end-relational theory of normativity with a comparative probabilistic semantics for 'ought' provides a more satisfactory solution.
Keywords Semantics of ought  Detaching problem  Normativity  Deontic modals  Instrumental principle
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-009-9640-7
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References found in this work BETA
Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Center for the Study of Language and Information.
Moral Realism: A Defence.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
On What Matters.Derek Parfit - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
Practical Reality.Jonathan Dancy - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Moral and Rational Commitment.Sam Shpall - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):146-172.
Wide and Narrow Scope.Sam Shpall - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (3):717-736.
'Ought' and Control.Matthew Chrisman - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):433-451.
Evidence Sensitivity in Weak Necessity Deontic Modals.Alex Silk - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (4):691-723.

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